

The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware  
corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP  
address 73.225.38.130,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:17-cv-01731-TSZ

**STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC'S MOTION  
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO  
VACATE, POSTPONE, AND/OR LIMIT  
DEPOSITION OF GREG LANSKY**

**NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:**

**FEBRUARY 22, 2019**

**I. INTRODUCTION & RELIEF REQUESTED**

Defendant John Doe, subscriber assigned IP address 73.225.38.130 ("Defendant"), seeks to depose Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC's ("Strike 3") co-founder Greg Lansky. However, Mr. Lansky has absolutely no knowledge relevant to the two remaining counterclaims in this matter: (1) declaration of non-infringement; and (2) abuse of process. Mr. Lansky is a movie producer. He has no involvement in, or unique knowledge of, Strike 3's copyright infringement litigation efforts or Strike 3's litigation efforts with respect to this case. In other words, any deposition of Mr. Lansky at this point is beyond the permissible scope of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Defendant's request to depose Mr. Lansky is a thinly veiled attempt to

STRIKE 3'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER RE:  
DEPOSITION OF GREG LANSKY - (2:17-CV-01731-TSZ) - 1

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1 annoy, harass, burden and oppress him for no good reason in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P.  
2 26(c)(1).

3 Accordingly, Strike 3 respectfully requests that this Court enter a protective order  
4 precluding Defendant from taking Mr. Lansky's deposition at all. In the alternative, if the Court  
5 will not enter such an order, Strike 3 respectfully requests that: (i) Mr. Lansky's deposition be  
6 postponed until *after* Defendant duly notices and deposes Strike 3 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  
7 30(b)(6); and (ii) if thereafter Defendant demonstrates to the Court that good cause exists to take  
8 Mr. Lansky's deposition, his deposition shall not exceed two hours on a single day and shall be  
9 strictly confined to issues relevant to this action.

## 10 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

11 On December 30, 2018, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel by email a notice of  
12 deposition for Mr. Lansky on January 31, 2019. Declaration of Lincoln Bandlow ("Bandlow  
13 Decl.") ¶ 3, Ex. A. Mr. Lansky is a member of General Media Systems, LLC ("GMS"), the  
14 parent company that owns Strike 3. Declaration of Greg Lansky ("Lansky Decl.") ¶ 1. He is the  
15 co-found of Strike 3 and Strike 3's highest and most well-known partner and figurehead. *Id.*  
16 Mr. Lansky oversees matters pertaining to branding, long term vision, and company  
17 development. *Id.* at ¶ 2.

18 Only two counterclaims remain in this case: (1) declaration of non-infringement; and  
19 (2) abuse of process. The declaration of non-infringement counterclaim is a non-issue.  
20 Immediately after Strike 3 was provided Defendant's name—which Defendant wrongfully  
21 withheld for six months after Strike 3 filed its complaint—Strike 3 investigated and determined  
22 Defendant's son, not Defendant, to be the likely infringer. Strike 3 then dismissed its action  
23 against Defendant (Dkt. # 53), rendering any discovery Defendant seeks to conduct from  
24 Plaintiff on that claim to be outside the scope of this action. Further, no discovery is necessary  
25 on Defendant's abuse of process counterclaims. All of the orders, motions, and materials on file  
26 in this case are subject to judicial notice and confirm Strike 3 has litigated this action fairly and

1 in full compliance with all Court orders. Thus, any discovery Defendant seeks that pertains to an  
2 alleged abuse of process is immaterial and propounded for the sole purpose of burdening and  
3 oppressing Strike 3.

4 Notwithstanding this, Mr. Lansky lacks knowledge relevant to both counterclaims. He is  
5 not involved in, nor has any unique personal knowledge about Strike 3's national litigation  
6 efforts to prosecute infringement of its copyrighted works, including any such efforts taken in the  
7 above-captioned case. Lansky Decl. at ¶ 2. Moreover, whatever limited knowledge he may have  
8 obtained with respect to Strike 3's litigation matters is from the dozens of lower-level officers  
9 and employees within Strike 3, all of whom would be more qualified to testify to the matters  
10 relevant here. *Id.* Further, whatever knowledge Mr. Lansky may have with respect to the  
11 creation and ownership of Strike 3's works is also known by several lower-level officers and  
12 employees. *Id.* In other words, deposing Mr. Lansky at all is improper, let alone doing so before  
13 deposing other Strike 3 employees or officers, or Strike 3 itself pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  
14 30(b)(6).

15 To date, Defendant has not sought to conduct a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition of  
16 Strike 3, which would properly allow Strike 3 to select one of its many dozen employees as its  
17 most knowledgeable person to testify on Strike 3's behalf. Bandlow Decl., ¶ 4. Instead,  
18 Defendant has attempted to bypass the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and take aim at Strike  
19 3's biggest name and an industry leader, all while paying no regard to whether Mr. Lansky has  
20 anything meaningful to contribute to the discovery process in this case, which he does not.<sup>1</sup>

21 Counsel for the parties met and conferred in good faith to resolve whether Defendant may  
22 depose Mr. Lansky, but unfortunately could not reach an agreement, thus necessitating this  
23 motion. Declaration of Bryan Case ("Case Decl.") at ¶¶ 2-3.

24  
25 <sup>1</sup> Defendant may argue that Mr. Lansky has personal knowledge apart from his employment with Strike 3 that could  
26 be relevant to this case. Even if this were true (and it is not), Defendant did not subpoena Mr. Lansky, a non-party,  
to appear at a deposition in his individual capacity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 45, but rather noticed his deposition  
as an officer and representative of Strike 3. Accordingly, such a deposition would clearly circumvent Fed.R.Civ.P.  
30(b)(6) and should be barred on this ground, alone.

1 **III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON**

2 Declarations of Greg Lansky, Lincoln Bandlow, and Bryan Case, and the exhibits thereto,  
3 and the Court file herein.

4 **IV. AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT**

5 **A. Legal Standard**

6 A court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from whom  
7 discovery is sought from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.  
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). To do so, a court may, among other things, forbid the discovery sought,  
9 prescribe a discovery method other than the one selected by the party, and/or forbid inquiry into  
10 certain matters or limit the scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A)(C) and (D). The  
11 party seeking protection must demonstrate harm or prejudice will result from the discovery.  
12 *Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.*, 364 F. 3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). The court has discretion to limit  
13 discovery when the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be  
14 obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”  
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).

16 “Virtually every court that has addressed deposition notices directed at an official at the  
17 highest level or ‘apex’ of corporate management has observed that such discovery creates a  
18 ***tremendous potential for abuse or harassment.***” *Celerity, Inc. v. Ulta Clean Holding, Inc.*,  
19 2007 WL 205067, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (emphasis added). “This is especially so where the  
20 information sought in the deposition can be obtained through less intrusive discovery methods  
21 (such as interrogatories) or from depositions of lower-level employees with more direct  
22 knowledge of the facts at issue.” *Id.* (citing *Salter v. Upjohn Co.*, 593 F. 2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.  
23 1979) (affirming postponement of deposition of corporation president who lacked direct  
24 knowledge of the relevant facts until after plaintiff deposed lower-level employees so plaintiff  
25 could determine whether president’s deposition was still necessary)). *See also M.A. Porazzi Co.*  
26 *v. The Mormaciark*, 16 F.R.D. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (same); *Colonial Capital Co. v. Gen.*

1 *Motors*, 29 F.R.D. 514, 518 (D. Conn. 1961) (requiring party propound interrogatories to  
2 company chairman before deposing him).

3 Moreover, where a high-level official “removed from the daily subjects of the litigation”  
4 has no unique personal knowledge of the facts at issue, a deposition of the official is improper.  
5 *Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 141 F.R.D. 332, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1991). *See also Harris v. Comput.*  
6 *Assocs. Int’l, Inc.*, 204 F.R.D. 44, 46-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding deposition of a high-level  
7 executive may be “duplicative, cumulative and burdensome” if the executive has no personal  
8 knowledge of the events in dispute). Indeed, where, as here, a high-level executive can  
9 contribute nothing more than a lower level employee, good cause is shown to not take the  
10 deposition of the high level executive. *Harris, supra* at 46.

11 **B. The Court Should Not Allow Defendant to Depose Mr. Lansky.**

12 Defendant’s proposed deposition of Mr. Lansky, Strike 3’s apex officer, is improper and  
13 is nothing more than an attempt to embarrass, harass, burden, and humiliate him and Strike 3 for  
14 however long Defendant wishes.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lansky has no knowledge relevant to the two narrow and  
15 remaining counterclaims left in this action. Moreover, Defendant has not and cannot  
16 demonstrate that Mr. Lansky has personal knowledge of any relevant facts in this action, let  
17 alone that any such facts would not be otherwise known by a lower-level employee. *See Reif v.*  
18 *CNA*, 248 F.R.D. 448, 454 (E.D. Penn. 2008) (requiring plaintiff demonstrate the apex officer  
19 possesses “any special or personal unique knowledge of the [case]” beyond data known by  
20 lower-level employees to take his deposition). Indeed, Mr. Lansky only involvement in this  
21 action is a mere declaration he submitted containing historical information about Strike 3’s  
22 parent company, GMS, the films that GMS produces, and the impact that widespread piracy of  
23 these films has had on GMS’ business—all matters that are irrelevant to Defendant’s remaining  
24 counterclaims. *See* Dkt. # 4-2. And, that declaration does not contain any facts or contentions

25 <sup>2</sup> Defendant arbitrarily proclaims in the deposition notice that Mr. Lansky’s examination “shall be conducted day to  
26 day until completed.” Any deposition in this case, absent extraordinary circumstances, is limited to just one day for  
seven hours pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(1), so requiring Mr. Lansky to clear multiple days in his calendar to be  
subjected to Defendant’s questioning without regard to the seven-hour time limit is blatantly inappropriate.

1 with respect to the detection of Defendant's infringement or the use of process to prosecute this  
2 action.

3 Mr. Lansky is not involved in, nor has any unique personal knowledge about, Strike 3's  
4 national litigation efforts to prosecute infringement of its copyrighted works, including any such  
5 efforts taken in the above-captioned case. Lansky Decl., at ¶ 2. Moreover, whatever limited  
6 knowledge he may have with respect to Strike 3's litigation matters has been obtained from the  
7 dozens of lower-level officers and employees within Strike 3, all of whom would be more  
8 qualified to testify to the matters relevant here. *Id.* And, whatever relevant knowledge Mr.  
9 Lansky may have with respect to the creation and/or ownership of Strike 3's works is known by  
10 lower-level officers and employees within Strike 3. *Id.*

11 Extracting this information from the most knowledgeable of these employees via a  
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition or by propounding interrogatories would be far less intrusive  
13 measures to obtain the data Defendant seeks, yet Defendant appears to be only interested in  
14 harassing Strike 3's executives rather than discovering facts actually relevant to this case.  
15 Indeed, targeting Mr. Lansky for deposition is not the first time in this action that Defendant has  
16 sought to embarrass him or otherwise acted inappropriately:

17 • "Strike 1" was Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss or Abate and For a More  
18 Definite Statement in which Defendant used Mr. Lansky's *nolo contendere* plea to a misdemeanor  
19 as evidence that GMS conducts business in California. Dkt. # 21 at p. 7. Not only is this  
20 improper per Cal. Pen. Code § 1016(3), which expressly states a no contest plea to a  
21 misdemeanor may not be used against a party in a civil action, but it is also a smear campaign  
22 done even though it was entirely irrelevant to this case—whether GMS conducts business in  
23 California has never been disputed.

24 • "Strike 2" was when Defendant needlessly assailed and harassed Strike 3's  
25 employee Susan Stalzer by publicly filing with the Court her comprehensive background  
26 report—unsealed—which included Ms. Stalzer's family member's names and information

1 pertaining to her home, vehicles, voting registration, and more private material. Dkt. # 21-24.  
 2 Incredibly, this was after Defendant's counsel hired a private detective, who made a surprise visit  
 3 to Ms. Stalzer's home (where her young children reside) to needlessly harass her and her family.  
 4 *Id.*; see also Dkt. # 26 at p. 8, fn. 4.

5 • And, now "Strike 3," seeking to depose, unduly burden, harass, and oppress Mr.  
 6 Lansky for no good reason at all where he has no relevant knowledge.

7 Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and (c)(1), the Court should not allow  
 8 Defendant to conduct an impermissible "apex" deposition of Mr. Lansky.

9 Alternatively, if Mr. Lansky is allowed to be deposed at some point, such deposition  
 10 should be postponed until after Defendant takes Strike 3's Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition  
 11 and/or serves interrogatories that seek whatever data Defendant hopes to obtain directly from Mr.  
 12 Lansky. In the unlikely event Defendant can demonstrate to the Court—after exhausting those  
 13 less-intrusive methods to obtain the discovery sought—that there exists good cause to take Mr.  
 14 Lansky's individual deposition, the Court should limit such a deposition to two hours. *See Apple*  
 15 *Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.*, 282 F.R.D. 259, 264-65 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (limiting the  
 16 deposition of Samsung's CEO to two hours because CEO was the "quintessential apex" of the  
 17 company, despite the fact that he may be found to have unique personal knowledge of issues  
 18 pertinent to the case). Such a limitation is especially warranted in this case since Defendant has  
 19 demonstrated an insatiable prurient interest in the personal affairs and private lives of Mr.  
 20 Lansky and his employees, notwithstanding the fact that no such information is, or has ever been,  
 21 remotely relevant to the action at hand.

## 22 **V. CONCLUSION**

23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter a protective order precluding Defendant  
 24 from deposing Mr. Lansky. Mr. Lansky lacks unique personal knowledge relevant to the two  
 25 narrow counterclaims remaining, and his deposition is designed solely to harass, annoy, burden  
 26 and oppress him and Strike 3. In the alternative, Mr. Lansky's deposition should be postponed

1 until after Defendant deposes Strike 3 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and, if thereafter  
2 Defendant demonstrates to the Court that good cause exists to take Mr. Lansky's deposition, any  
3 such deposition should be limited to two hours on a single day and be strictly confined to issues  
4 relevant to this case.

5 DATED this 7<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2019.

6 FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

7  
8 s/ Bryan J. Case

9 Bryan J. Case, WSBA #41781

10 Lincoln D. Bandlow, *admitted Pro Hac Vice*  
11 (CSBA #170449)

12 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on February 7, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following persons:

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☒ Via CM/ECF  
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☐ Via Facsimile

DATED this 7<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2019.

  
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Courtney R. Tracy